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Executive Summary 
 
7KLV SDSHU DSSOLHV WKH FRQFHSW RI µPHGLDWLVDWLRQ¶ DV D WKHRUHWLFDO IUDPHZRUN WR WUDQVLWLRQDO
democracies. In doing so it addresses the question of how recent changes in the media 
environment impact on the dynamics and outcomes of struggles for democratic transition. 
The argument is based on two propositions: First, mediatisation is best understood as a 
transformative process that defies clear cause-effect attributions. Second, besides 
journalistic media as institutions of public communication, communication technologies have 
also to be considered as a crucial factor that drives the mediatisation of politics, and indeed 
transitional politics. We conclude by pointing out that mediatisation in emerging democracies 
is a multi-faceted and often ambiguous process that is shaped by the political, social and 
cultural context in which it takes place. It thus results in different configurations of the media-
politics nexus than in established western democracies, at times serving to strengthen 
democratic transition, at others to undermine it. 
The paper: 
x 3UHVHQWV DQ RXWOLQH RI WKH FRQFHSW RI µPHGLDWLVDWLRQ¶ ZKLFK SURYLGHV D FRQFHSWXDO
framework for understanding how an ever expanding media sphere interacts with and 
shapes public communication and ultimately the institutional processes of democratic 
politics. The focus is on aspects of political communication but also brings in 
technological perspectives of media and communication to broaden the largely 
institutional understanding of mediatisation in the political communication field. 
x Discusses the communicative dimension of democratisation ± the way in which the 
communication environment creates opportunities as well as constraints for 
democratic transformations and how in turn the transition process re-configures public 
communication. 
x $GGUHVVHV TXHVWLRQV DURXQG WKH TXDOLW\ RI HPHUJLQJ µIRXUWK ZDYH¶ GHPRFUDFLHV WR
what extent they provide spaces for effective participation and allow for a 
comprehensive mechanism of accountability. We focus on two aspects of this: the 
transformation of citizenship and how citizens incorporate media and communication 
technologies in their activism and how this affects grassroots mobilisation; and the 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQRISRZHUDQGKRZSROLWLFDO OHDGHUVDQGJRYHUQPHQWVDGMXVWWR µPHGLD
ORJLF¶WKHUHE\JLYLQJZD\WRQHZLQVWLWXWLRQDOIRUPVRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ 
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1. Introduction1 
Over the last decades democratic politics has been undergoing dramatic changes, 
which have not only transformed the institutions and processes of political decision making 
but also the wider political culture of collective beliefs and practices. Virtually all 
contemporary democracies struggle with a widening gulf between political elites and ordinary 
citizens who are turning away from institutionalised politics and their representatives. At the 
same time, political debates are becoming increasingly polarised with hostile camps pitched 
against each other, thus leaving little room for political negotiation and compromise. In a 
growing number of countries, policy deadlock and public anger have paved the way for 
populist candidates who challenge the liberal idea of an open society and promote seemingly 
simple, but authoritarian solutions to popular fears. 
In this paper, our primary focus lies on new or emerging democracies of the so-called 
µIRXUWKZDYH¶ 2 that started after the demise of Soviet-led communism in Eastern Europe and 
quickly spread across the globe, especially Asia and Africa and more recently the Arab world. 
With the off-VHW RI WKH µIRXUWK ZDYH¶ DQ XQSUHFHGHQWHG QXPEHU RI FRXQWULHV HPEDUNHG Rn 
establishing democratic rule. Yet after a period of popular enthusiasm, democratic 
development in many of these countries is stagnating and even reversing. Given the 
apparent flaws in many emerging democracies, democratisation scholars have pointed at the 
growing divergence of democracy (Diamond and Plattner, 2001), indicating a widening gap 
between new and old democracies. However, what is striking is that the situation in these 
new democracies resembles very much the description of the current crisis of established 
GHPRFUDFLHVFLWL]HQV¶GLVLOOXVLRQPHQWZLWKWKHLQWHJULW\DQGHIILFLHQF\RIH[LVWLQJGHPRFUDWLF
institutions, polarisation and a politics of zero-sum games, alongside authoritarianism as an 
emerging alternative to post-transitional chaos and insecurity. Thus, parallel to the 
divergence of democracy, there is also a movement of convergence at work towards an 
erosion of the liberal project encompassing both old and new democracies (Voltmer, 2015).  
Yet the situation is more complex than that. While both old and new democracies 
show similar symptoms of crisis, they have to cope with the challenges of a volatile political 
and economic environment from different vantage points of their development. Transitional 
                                                          
1
 We would like to thank Jay Blumler, Christian Christensen and Nebojsa Vladisavljevic for their 
insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
2
 Based on the observation that transitions to democracy are not evenly distributed over time, but 
RFFXULQFOXVWHUV+XQWLQJWRQLQWURGXFHGWKHFRQFHSWRI µZDYHV¶RIGHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ$FFRUGLQJ
to his historical outline, the first wave took place in the early 19th century with the introduction of 
common suffrage after the French and American revolutions, the second after the end of World War II 
and decolonisation, and finally the third in the early 1970s with the end of military dictatorships in 
southern Europe and Latin America. Some authors (see Doorenspleet, 2005; McFaul, 2002) suggest 
that post-communist pathways of regime change differ from earlier transitions and should therefore be 
UHJDUGHGDVDµZDYH¶LQWKHLURZQULJKW 
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politics lacks the comfort of relying on a routinised system of procedures and policies that 
helps to maintain control over the political agenda. Moreover, democratic transitions ± albeit 
desirable and fought for with high costs ± are a shock to both institutional structures and the 
individuals who are living through the upheaval. In the transition process, it becomes 
frustratingly clear that the other side of the river is further away and more difficult to reach 
than initially hoped. Consequently, transition as a long-term state of instability makes 
emerging democracies more vulnerable to both external shocks and internal authoritarian 
contenders than their established counterparts. 
0RUHRYHUGHPRFUDFLHVRIWKHµIRXUWKZDYH¶DOVRGLIIHUIURPFRXQWULHVWKDWXQGHUZHQW
democratic regime changes at earlier points of history. An important feature of recent 
WUDQVLWLRQV LV WKDW WKH\ WDNHSODFHXQGHU WKHFRQGLWLRQVRIZKDW-RKQ.HDQHFDOOV ³D
UHYROXWLRQDU\DJHRIFRPPXQLFDWLYHDEXQGDQFH«>WKDWLV@VWUXFWXUHGE\DQHZZRUOGV\VWHP
of overlapping aQG LQWHUOLQNHGPHGLDGHYLFHV´ LELG S 6WDUWLQJ LQ WKHPLGV
technological innovations, accompanied by a fundamental paradigm shift in media regulation, 
have opened up an expansion of communicative spaces following an unprecedented 
proliferation of channels and demand-driven forms of public communication. The rise of the 
internet in the early 2000s and its availability through a broad range of platforms has further 
accelerated this development and has fundamentally changed the way in which messages 
are produced, distributed and consumed. This raises the question of what the consequences 
are of these far-reaching changes in the communication environment on the processes and 
outcomes of recent transitions. This question lies at the centre of the current paper. 
While most of the existing democratisation literature has focused on institutional 
perspectives of transition, much less scholarship has been devoted to theorising and 
empirically investigating the communicative dimension of democratisation ± the way in which 
the communication environment creates opportunities as well as constraints for democratic 
transformations and how in turn the transition process re-configures public communication 
(Jebril et al., 2013; Voltmer, 2013; Zielonka, 2015). Successful democratisation not only 
requires political, judicial and often economic changes, but also the transformation of public 
communication that goes far beyond the formal guarantees of freedom of speech and press 
freedom. By moving the dealings of power from secretive spaces of negotiation into the 
arena of public scrutiny and popular decision making, the transformation of public 
communication raises a broad range of issues: who has access to the public arena of debate; 
how can political leaders move from a language of propaganda to a language of persuasion 
that addresses citizens as autonomous individuals rather than subjects; how is a national 
conversation about the past and the future of the country possible in a multi-channel 
environment? The four cRXQWULHV WKDW DUH VWXGLHG LQ WKH SURMHFW µ0HGLD &RQIOLFW DQG
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'HPRFUDWLVDWLRQ 0H&R'(0¶ ± Egypt, Kenya, Serbia and South Africa ± provide rich 
HPSLULFDO HYLGHQFH WR EHWWHU XQGHUVWDQG KRZ WKH QHZ HQYLURQPHQW RI µFRPPXQLFDWLYH
DEXQGDQFH¶ DIIHFWV IRXUWK-wave GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQV )URP 6RXWK $IULFD¶V ILUVW SRVW-Apartheid 
HOHFWLRQ LQ  WR (J\SW¶V ODUJHO\ IDLOHG DWWHPSW RI GHPRFUDWLF WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ WKH IRXU
0H&R'(0FRXQWULHVUHIOHFWWKHGLYHUVHDQGDPELYDOHQWH[SHULHQFHRIWKHµIRXUWKZDYH¶,QDOO
four countries, the media have played a pivotal role in key moments of the transition by 
shaping the behaviour and perceptions of citizens, activists and elites who were involved in 
the struggle for change. 
This paper sets out to discuss the role of media and communication in the 
transformation of political power and citizenship in emerging democracies. To do so, we draw 
RQ WKH QRWLRQ RI µPHGLDWLVDWLRQ¶ ZKLFK SURYLGHV D FRQFHSWXDO IUDPHZRUN IRU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ
how an ever expanding media sphere interacts with and shapes public communication and 
ultimately the institutional processes of democratic politics. Existing research on 
mediatisation has almost exclusively focused on established, mostly western democracies 
with advanced economies and media systems, with some authors even implying that 
mediatisation is only possible in contexts where the media have developed into actors with 
highly institutionalised routines and extensive professional and economic resources that 
allow them to play an independent role in political life (Esser and Matthes, 2013). By applying 
WKHFRQFHSWRIPHGLDWLVDWLRQ WRHPHUJLQJGHPRFUDFLHVZKHUH WKHPHGLD¶V LQGHSHQGHQFH LV
often constrained by a variety of internal and external factors, we aim to add a more nuanced 
understanding of the multifaceted and ambiguous process of the transformative power of 
media and communication.  
The paper starts off with an overview of the main arguments of current mediatisation 
scholarship, by focusing in particular on aspects of political communication. We also bring in 
technological perspectives of media and communication to broaden the largely institutional 
understanding of mediatisation in the political communication field. We then discuss how 
WRGD\¶V FKDQJLQJ FRPPXQLFDWLRQ HQYLURQPHQW RI PXOWL-platform media, networked political 
action and professional news management has become an integral part of the dynamics of 
democratic transitions. We argue that even though the concept of mediatisation has been 
developed in the context of advanced democracies, the process of mediatisation is equally at 
work in transitional and less democratic circumstances. Moreover, the unique features of 
µIRXUWKZDYH¶WUDQVLWLRQV± their institutional fragility alongside the expansion of citizen politics 
± can be perceived as the outcome of mediatised democratisation processes. 
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2. Mediatisation: the changing relationship between media, political power and 
citizens 
µ0HGLDWLVDWLRQ¶ KDVEHFRPHRQHRI WKHNH\ FRQFHSWV LQ&RPPXQLFDWLRQ6WXGLHVEXW
plays a particularly important role in political communication research that is concerned with 
investigating the changing relationship between political power and the media (Esser and 
Strömbäck, 2014). Alongside this strand of research, a growing body of literature is emerging 
that views mediatisation as a broader process that affects all social fields, including 
economics, education, religion, and so on (Hjarvard, 2013; Lundby, 2009; Sa Martino, 2013). 
Arguably, the use of means of communication has been part of human history from its early 
beginnings. These general processes of conveying messages and meaning constructions 
DUH FDSWXUHG E\ WKH WHUP RI µPHGLDWLRQ¶ ,Q FRQWUDVW µPHGLDWLVDWLRQ¶ LV UHJDUGHG DV D
historically new phenomenon that is designed to describe the transformative power of 
mediated communication which permeates all aspects of social life ± from the private sphere 
to the international arena (Hepp et al., 2015).  
In contrast to media effects research that seeks to identify the influence of specified 
communication variables ± features of a text, media types, usage patterns, and so on ± on 
particular manifestations of human orientations and behaviour, the concept of mediatisation 
DLPV WR XQGHUVWDQG ³WKH ZLGHU FRQVHTXHQFHV RI PHGLDWHG FRPPXQLFDWLRQV RQ RXU SUHVHQW
FXOWXUHVDQGVRFLHWLHV´&RXOGU\ and Hepp, 2013, p. 195). These consequences rarely follow 
a simple cause-effect logic with a unidirectional sequence of events. Rather, mediatisation 
involves simultaneous, interactive relationships between changes in the technologies, 
formats and practices of communication on the one hand, and society and culture on the 
other. 
Politics and the media: from interdependence to mediatisation 
In the context of political communication, mediatisation denotes a fundamental 
transformation in the relationship between political power and the media with far-reaching 
consequences for democratic politics. Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999, p. 250) describe 
PHGLDWLVHG SROLWLFV DV ³SROLWLFV WKDW KDV ORVW LWV DXWRQRP\ KDV EHFRPH GHSHQGHQW LQ LWV
central functions on mass media, and is continuously shaped by the interactions with mass 
PHGLD´,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHPHGLDDUHQRORQJHUH[WHUQDOWRSROLWLFVDWRROWKDWFDQEHXVHGRU
not, but have become an integral part of politics, thereby remoulding the practices of 
representation and decision making and even the institutional structures in which these 
processes take place. In a similar vein, Strömbäck (2008) distinguishes between the 
DGDSWDWLRQ WR µPHGLD ORJLF¶± RU WKHQRUPVDQGURXWLQHV WKDWJRYHUQ WKHPHGLD¶VRSHUDWLRQV
(Altheide and Snow, 1979) ± and its internalisation by political actors that marks the unique 
quality of mediatisation. The former is usually confined to adjustments in the daily routines of 
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news management, like scheduling press conferences to fit editorial deadlines, providing 
visual material to enhance the chances of coverage, and so on; whereas the latter affects the 
organisational setup and decision-making procedures of politics. For example, political 
parties have not only adapted the content of their messages to make them compatible with 
journalistic news values but have also changed the criteria for selecting their leaders. The 
imperatives of a streamlined media campaign have also led to a centralisation of party 
organisations and, as a consequence, to a loss of intra-party democracy and grass-roots 
participation (for the example of the British Labour Party, see Wring, 1998). Other research 
shows that mediatisation even affects substantial politics, as policy makers anticipate how 
particular policy proposals PLJKWµVHOO¶LQWKHPHGLDDQGDGMXVWWKHWLPLQJEXWDOVRWKHFRQWHQW
of policy decisions and in some cases even drop particular policy initiatives altogether (Davis, 
2010; Koch-Baumgarten and Voltmer, 2010; Schillemans, 2012; Walgrave and Van Aelst, 
2006).  
As a consequence, political actors have been forced to develop effective strategies to 
defend themselves against an ever more intrusive media environment. They have done so 
by adopting professional PR methods to streamline messages for public consumption, but 
also by developing more sophisticated methods of secrecy. Professional communication 
strategists and media advisors have become an indispensable part of any political 
organisation ± from governments to political parties and NGOs. In this process, 
communication advisors have moved into the inner circles of the decision making process 
itself, even though many of them come from outside politics with little understanding of the 
ideological and institutional  framework in which politics operates and distinguishes it from 
the corporate world. 
Underlying these transformations is the assumption of a changing power balance 
between media and politics that has shifted from a state where the media were subservient 
to their political masters, to an equilibrium beWZHHQ WKH WZR DFWRUV DQG RQ WR µPHGLDWLVHG
SROLWLFV¶ WKDW LV GRPLQDWHG E\ µPHGLD ORJLF¶ ± a process that Blumler and Kavanagh (1999) 
GHVFULEHDVDSURJUHVVLRQRIWKUHHFRQVHFXWLYHµDJHV¶RISROLWLFDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQ7KHDERYH-
mentioned definition of mediatisation by Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) as the loss of 
autonomy of politics vis-à-vis then increasingly pervasive and invasive media points in a 
similar direction.  
:KLOH WKH KLVWRULFDO DSSURDFK RI µWKUHH DJHV¶ RI SROLWLFDO FRPPXQLFDWLRQ SURYLGHV
convincing explanations for the rise of mediatisation in western democracies, it also has its 
SLWIDOOV 7KH QRWLRQ RI PHGLDWLVDWLRQ SURJUHVVLQJ RYHU KLVWRULFDO µDJHV¶ LPSOLHV D GHJUHH RI
uniformity and inevitability, which empirically does not exist. As mediatisation interacts with 
institutional structures, practices and communication cultures, it can be assumed that 
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GLIIHUHQWDUHDVRISROLWLFVPHUJHZLWKµPHGLDORJLF¶WRGLIIHUHQWGHJUHHV6WU|PElFNDQG(VVHU
2014). Because of its dependence on public support, electoral politics is most vulnerable to 
WKH LQWHUQDOLVDWLRQ RI µPHGLD ORJLF¶ ZKHUHDV SROLF\ DUHDV WKDW DUH GRPLQDWHG E\ WKH FLYLO
service and a high degree of inertia are better able to detach themselves from unpredictable 
dynamics of publicity. Thus, layers of highly mediatised politics and traditional, largely 
unmediated politics coexist, even within the same institution.  
Rather than seeing mediatisation as a progressive development, it is better 
understood as a dialectical process in which the responses of actors can lead to unforeseen 
outcomes. Indeed, in many cases the consequence of mediatisation is de-mediatisation. It is 
XQOLNHO\ WKDW SROLWLFDO DFWRUV DFFHSW WKH GRPLQDQFH RI µPHGLD ORJLF¶ LI WKLV XQGHUPLQHV WKHLU
ability to implement policies and to mobilise popular support in the most effective way. 
Another outcome of mediatisation that contradicts the initial assumptions of a shifting power 
balance in favour of the media is a concentration and accumulation of political power ± rather 
WKDQWKH µFRORQLVDWLRQ¶RISROLWLFVE\ µPHGLD ORJLF¶ 0H\HU7KHVWUDWHJLFUHVSRQVHVRI
SROLWLFLDQVWRWKHFKDQJLQJPHGLDHQYLURQPHQWQRWRQO\DLPWRQHXWUDOLVHDQGGHIOHFW µPHGLD
ORJLF¶EXWPRUH LPSRUWDQWO\ WUDQVIRUP LW LQWRDUHVRXUFH WRFRQWURO WKHSROLWLFDODJenda. The 
result is a more centralised, manipulated and elite-driven process of public communication. 
The prerequisites of mediatisation 
Three distinct, but closely interconnected developments that set off in the 1980s are 
believed to have created a fundamentally new media environment, thus accelerating the 
process of mediatisation: the proliferation of channels, a re-orientation of professional 
journalism and the transformation of citizenship.  
(1) While broadcasting was characterised by channel scarcity from its beginning, 
technological innovations such as satellite and cable transmission have led to a rapid 
proliferation of channels, but also a fragmentation of programmes, genres and 
audiences. Trans-border communication, made possible by new communication 
technologies, undermined the significance of the nation state as a communicative 
space, controlled by national laws and regulatory agencies. The rise of the internet 
and Web2.0 in the early 2000s shifted the changing boundaries of time and space 
even further while at the same time challenging the significance and economic 
viability of legacy media (print, broadcasting). For political actors the new multi-
channel environment offers entirely new opportunities of communicating with targeted 
audiences; but the fragmentation also makes political communication an increasingly 
unpredictable arena of contested truths and counter-narratives that forces political 
actors to acquire a new level of sophistication in message management. So far, only 
a few political elites have risen to the task. For most of them, the new multi-channel 
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HQYLURQPHQWLVDV%OXPOHUDQG.DYDQDJKSOXFLGO\GHVFULEHLWDµK\GUD-
KHDGHGEHDVW¶WKDWGHILHVVXERUGLQDWLRQDQGFRQWDLQPHQW 
 
(2) Driven by increased competition and commercial pressures, journalism in Western 
democracies has taken on a more adversarial stance towards politics. Abandoning a 
more sacerdotal attitude towards political authorities that had governed the 
relationship between politics and the media in the decades following the end of WW2, 
WKH µZDWFKGRJ¶ UROH RI WKH PHGLD KDV EHFRPH PRUH SURPLQHQW DPRQJ WRGD\¶V
journalists, but so have more aggressive forms of journalism such as sensationalism 
and scandalisation. McNair (2009, pp. 244±246) even talks about an emerging 
µK\SHU-DGYHUVDULDOLVP¶ WKDW EUHHGV QHJDWLYLVP DQG F\QLFLVP DQG V\VWHPDWLFDOO\
prevents deliberative conversations in public communication. This change in 
journalism has not been without consequences for the relationship between politics 
and media. Thus, mediatisation involves paradoxical developments of increased 
interdependency, even symbiosis, between political actors and journalists on the one 
hand, and a broadening gulf of hostility and mutual mistrust on the other. 
 
(3) Most of the literature on mediatisation focuses on the relationship between political 
power and the media, whereas citizens and their preferences merely serve as a 
target of ever-FKDQJLQJFDPSDLJQVWUDWHJLHV+RZHYHUFKDQJHVLQFLWL]HQV¶DWWLWXGHs 
and behaviour are closely interrelated with the mediatisation of politics and the 
changing media environment. Citizens and new forms of citizenship are both drivers 
of mediatisation and are transformed by it. Over the last decades, demographic and 
social changes ± the dissolution of traditional ties and individualisation, the 
emergence of a more complex and fragmented society and the acceleration of social 
and geographical mobility ± have re-configured the relationship between citizens and 
politics. With party identification in decline and a growing level of cynicism towards 
political authorities, the norms of citizenship have altered dramatically. A growing 
number of citizens, especially the younger generation, have turned their backs on 
institutionalised politics. However, as research has shown, this does not necessarily 
imply democracy is left without citizens. Rather, citizens have developed new forms of 
political action and organisational forms outside the electoral process to express their 
views and influence the course of politics, with new social movements being the most 
YLVLEOHDQGHIIHFWLYHPDQLIHVWDWLRQRIWKLVµQHZSROLWLFV¶'DOWRQ 
 
Arguing that political communication cannot be understood without taking the active 
role of citizens into account, Brants and Voltmer (2011) make a point of introducing citizens 
into their model of mediatisation. In their view, the relationship between citizens and political 
communication elites ± politicians, journalists ± is characterised by a process of de-
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centralisation, whereby citizens move into arenas of communication that are outside the 
control of elite politics. Yet, like party politics and government, the emerging forms of 
citizenship are also highly dependent on and shaped by the media, in particular internet-
based platforms. These new communication technologies not only empower and enable a 
new repertoire of political action, they have also brought about new organisational forms of 
mobilisation. It can therefore be argued that the transformation of citizenship is part of a 
ZLGHU SURFHVV RI PHGLDWLVDWLRQ WKDW LQYROYHV ERWK QHZ GHSHQGHQFLHV RQ WKH µORJLF¶ RI
mediated communication and new opportunities of voice and action. 
 
3. Mediatisation and communication technologies 
Political communication scholars understand mediatisation as an institutional process 
that involves independent actors who are making strategic choices to shape and manipulate 
their relationship. In this approach, communication technologies are seen as external to the 
process. In other words, it is journalism that interacts with and transforms power politics, 
ZKHUHDVFRPPXQLFDWLRQWHFKQRORJLHVDUHVHHQDVWRROVWKDWDUHXVHGWRRSWLPLVHDQDFWRU¶V
communication efforts. The problem of excluding technologies from an understanding of 
mediatisation becomes particularly evident with regard to the internet. Clearly, the internet is 
not an institution in the traditional sense like a media organisation; yet at the same time, 
more than any other medium before, it is transforming political action and political 
organisations in ways that invite different logics of action; it is arguably even transforming 
mediatisation itself. To account for such transformations, we need to move beyond an 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOIRFXVLQRXUFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIERWKµPHGLDORJLF¶DQGPHGLDWLVDWLRQ 
0HGLD VFKRODUV KDYH FRQYLQFLQJO\ SRLQWHG RXW WKDW ZKDW ZH FDOO µPHGLD¶ FDQQRW EH
separated into technologies and content. Instead, both are intertwined and together create a 
VSHFLILFµPHGLDORJLF¶WKDWFRPELQHVWHFKQRORJLFDOVWUXFWXUe and purposeful agency. This is 
particularly evident in the case of social media where technological affordances and 
practices of use result in the convergence of the content producer and consumer roles into 
µSURGXVHUV¶ 6LOYHUVWRQH¶V  QRWLRQ RI µGRXEOH DUWLFXODWLRQ¶ DFFRXQWV IRU WKLV
interdependency between technology and content. Writing about the medium of television, 
he argues that the medium is doubly articulated in our everyday lives because we 
appropriate it both as a material object, which has aesthetic and functional qualities, and as a 
medium that, through its structure and content, mediates meanings (ibid. 1994, pp. 82±3). In 
the case of the internet and, more specifically, social media, Klinger and Svensson (2015) 
argue that we should consLGHUD IXUWKHU WZRGLPHQVLRQVRI µPHGLD ORJLF¶ LQDGGLWLRQ WR WKH
IRFXVRI WUDGLWLRQDO µPHGLD ORJLF¶RQ WKHSURGXFWLRQRIFRQWHQW WKHGLVWULEXWLRQRI LQIRUPDWLRQ
and practices of use. These three dimensions together help us consider the differences in 
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hoZ WHFKQRORJ\ DQG FRQWHQW LQWHUUHODWH LQ WUDGLWLRQDO µPHGLD ORJLF¶ DQG LQ ZKDW .OLQJHU DQG
6YHQVVRQ WHUP µQHWZRUN PHGLD ORJLF¶ 7KH ODWWHU LV FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ LQH[SHQVLYH FRQWHQW
production by lay users who also distribute and intermediate popular content and use social 
media in interest-bound and like-minded peer networks (ibid. 2015, p. 1246). 
These characteristics result in political communication that is driven by virality, which 
rewards emotional and personalised content, and is distributed through personal networks 
(ibid. 2015, p. 1253). Practices of use that engender a high level of selective exposure are 
reinforced by, for instance, search engines that employ ± unnoticeable to the user ± 
algorithms to personalise search results with the effect that it is now unlikely that two people 
using the same search term get the same results (Dahlgren and Alvares, 2013, p. 53). 
µ1HWZRUNPHGLDORJLF¶WKXVPHDQVWKDWZKDWKDVEHHQKDLOHGDVDWHFKQRORJ\WKDWJLYHVYRLFH
to previously powerless actors and access to an unlimited pool of human knowledge 
increasingly functions like an echo chamber where the chance to encounter unexpected 
views is systematically reduced (Pariser, 2011). Moreover, while the internet has facilitated 
the expansion and revitalisation of civil society, it has also empowered extremist politics and 
promotes polarisation and fragmentation. The internet on its own does not engage the 
disengaged, neither does its network structure ± as often assumed ± build political 
FRPPXQLWLHVDQGµHQOLJKWHQHGV\PSDWK\¶2QWKHFRQWUDU\WKHH[WUHPHOHYHORIFKRLFHOHDGV
± paradoxically ± to uniformity and avoidance of difference (Mutz and Young, 2011). Where 
encounters with those who think differently do happen, they are often characterised by a 
decided lack of civility (Dahlgren and Alvares, 2013, p. 56). 
If we recall the definition of mediatisation as a process whereby the media become an 
integral part of other actors or systems with the effect that the practices of these 
actors/systems are increasingly shaped by WKHPHGLD¶VORJLFRIRSHUDWLRQWKHQLWLVSRVVLEOH
to apply the concept of mediatisation to the internet as well. Mazzoleni (2014) extends the 
theoretical framework of mediatisation to the internet and especially social media. By 
LQWURGXFLQJ WKH WHUP µ0HGLDWLVDWLRQ ¶ KH GHVFULEHV D VLWXDWLRQ ZKHUH ³WKH ORJLF RI WKH
WUDGLWLRQDO PHGLD EOHQGV ZLWK LQWHUDFWLYH PRGHV RI FRPPXQLFDWLRQ´ LELG  S 
µ1HWZRUNPHGLD ORJLF¶ WKXVFRH[LVWVDORQJVLGHDQG LQWHUVHFWVZLWK WUDGLWLRQDO µPHGLD ORJLF¶ LQ
µK\EULG ORJLFV¶ &KDGZLFNS.OLQJHUDQG6YHQVVRQS WKDWVKDSH
constrain and enable the production of, and access to, knowledge as well as the options for 
political action. 
'LIIHUHQW W\SHV RI SROLWLFDO DFWRUV KDYH DGDSWHG WR µQHWZRUN PHGLD ORJLF¶ WR GLIIHUHQW
extents. Even though institutionalised politics is already deeply affected by the dynamics of 
digital media, as exemplified by large-scale disclosures of classified documents by the 
whistle-blowing platform Wikileaks, it struggles to employ the logic of the internet strategically 
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to its own advantage. And this is not just a generational problem (most current office holders 
DUHQRWµGLJLWDOQDWLYHV¶ZKRKDYHJURZQXSZLWKWKHLQWHUQHWEXWOHQGVLWVHOIWRWKHPLVPDWFK
between formalised politics and the liquid, non-institutionalised character of internet politics. 
Certainly digital media are increasingly being used in mainstream politics, in particular 
election campaigns (see Bimber, 2014 on how the 2008 and 2012 Obama campaigns form 
turning points in this respect); however, with few exceptions, the organisational logic of digital 
and social media has not saturated mainstream political parties to the extent that traditional 
µPHGLD ORJLF¶ KDV 5DWKHU GLJLWDO PHGLD ODUJHO\ IXQFWLRQ DV Dn additional element in a 
campaign organised around traditional media logic. Although some new parties in Europe 
form exceptions in this respect ± Podemos in Spain and the Pirate parties in Iceland, 
Germany and Sweden successfully use network-based organisational structures (Casero-
5LSROOpV HW DO  DV GRHV DUJXDEO\ -HUHP\ &RUE\Q¶V µ0RPHQWXP¶ FDPSDLJQ IRU
leadership of the British Labour Party ± µPHGLDWLVDWLRQ ¶ LV RQO\ VORZO\ UHDFKLQJ WKH
institutions and practices of elite politics.  
In contrast, we find a high degree of web-based mediatisation in the arena of citizen 
politics. In fact, digital media have transformed citizenship into a vivid space of debate, self-
governance and political action. Social movements like Occupy or the Arab Spring have 
highlighted the potential of the internet to mobilise large-scale protests and to forge collective 
identities across borders (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012). Much of the literature on these new 
movements treat digital media as tools that empower citizens to mobilise more efficiently and 
with greater impact. Bennett and Segerberg (2012) go a step further by arguing that the 
internet, and in particular social media, have fundamentally changed the strategies of political 
activists and have brought about new forms of political organisation. The authors make the 
distinction between the logics of connective and collective action, and we can relate these 
forms of action to notions of mediatisation2.0 and mediation in the context of contentious 
politics. Both logics of citizen politics may coexist, often within one and the same group or 
organisation and may depend on resources and know-how, but also the insight into the 
power of virtual interpersonal encounters. The logic of collective action uses digital media in 
a traditional, top-down organisational structure to mediate shared political ideas and 
collective identities (ibid. 2012). The logic of connective action, in contrast, uses digital media 
in a way that changes the core dynamics of the action, creating a flat, decentralised structure 
of organisation that enables the use of personal action frames that are inclusive of different 
personal reasons for contesting a situation that needs to be changed (ibid. 2012, p. 744). 
Thus, connective action can be viewed as a manifestation of mediatisation where new media 
play a transformational role on politics and citizen participation.  
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To sum up, the current debate on the mediatisation of politics has developed a 
compelling theoretical framework to understand how a changing media environment shapes 
the way in which politics is communicated, and even permeates and alters the processes 
and outcomes of both institutionalised and citizen politics. However, little is known about how 
different contextual conditions ± political systems, media ecologies, communication cultures - 
modify the degree and impact of mediatisation, and most of the comparative work done on 
mediatisation so far is confined to a few advanced democracies in Western Europe and 
North America (see e.g. Maurer and Pfetsch, 2014; Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2011; Zeh and 
Hopmann, 2013). We argue that rather than looking at the influence of the media in isolation, 
it is important to understand mediatisation as a reciprocal and contingent process that can be 
amplified, but also suppressed, by factors external to the media. As will be shown in the next 
section, these changes associated with the mediatisation of politics are not only re-
configuring democratic politics in established democracies, but have put emerging 
democracies on a new pathway of transition.  
 
4. Mediatisation and democratisation 
Sensibility to context is particularly pertinent when analysing trends of mediatisation 
in emerging democracies. Even though new democracies share some of the main problems 
of transitions, such as difficult institutional choices, social instability and tensions between 
supporters of the old and the new order, the variation between them is much bigger than the 
variation between advanced western democracies. This makes it even harder to come to a 
conclusive judgement of the forms and degrees of mediatisation in emerging democracies. 
Some of them belong to the poorest countries of the world (e.g. Afghanistan, Mali), others 
have strong economies that are able to compete in global markets (e.g. South Korea and 
Taiwan, South Africa from the MeCoDEM sample). Some countries have only weak and 
inefficient state institutions (e.g. Kenya), while in others democratic change is stifled by an 
overpowering state inherited from the previous regime (e.g. Egypt). Moreover, many new 
democracies, especially in Eastern Europe and Africa, have experienced violent unrest and 
territorial change in the aftermath of the transition (e.g. Serbia from the MeCoDEM sample). 
Even though an exploration of context-specific variations of mediatisation exceeds the 
limitations of this paper, we have to be mindful that any generalisations are tentative and 
require further empirical investigation. 
Yet studying mediatisation in new democracies has to start with a more fundamental 
question: do the media in these countries have the capacity to operate in accordance with 
WKHLURZQ µORJLF¶ WRDQH[WHQW WKDWIRUFHVSROLWLFDODFWRUV WRDGDSW WRDQGLQFRUSRUDWHPHGLD
strategies into their own strategic and organisational setup? Even though virtually all 
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emerging democracies have implemented the principles of freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press in their constitutions, the lack of respect for the autonomy of the media 
and attempts by political elites to bring the media under their control is endemic. According to 
6WU|PElFN DQG (VVHU¶V  S  PXOWL-dimensional definition, media autonomy is an 
HVVHQWLDOSDUWRIPHGLDWLVDWLRQ³ZLWKRXWKLJKO\DXWRQRPRXVPHGLDLQVWLWXWLRQVWKHUHZRXOGEH
QRPHGLDWL]DWLRQRISROLWLFV´ This would obviously rule out the possibility of mediatisation in 
any of the MeCoDEM countries, and indeed in most emerging democracies. However, when 
approaching the relationship between media and politics outside the established 
democracies of the West, a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of transitional 
societies is required. 
First, even though emerging democracies go through a period of dramatic change, 
there are also sectors of societies that resist change, resulting in a juxtaposition of old and 
new institutional structures, practices and beliefs. For the media, the downfall of the old 
regime frequently unleashes a new sense of freedom amongst journalists, giving rise to an 
almost anarchic public space of diverse, often extremist voices. Even though the post-
transitional honeymoon of free speech is quickly countered by new forms of political control, 
there is usually no return to the censorship of the old regime. Journalists in emerging 
democracies look out for new role models to re-construct their professional identity and to 
reposition themselves vis-à-vis political power. In most cases they look westwards and adopt 
an understanding of journalism that emphasises the watchdog role and almost cynical 
attitudes towards politicians. Demonstrating distance from a discredited state and its 
representatives is vital for journalists in a transitional context who have to secure their own 
legitimacy with a more critical and sceptical audience. Thus, even though media and 
journalism in emerging democracies might fall short of the standards of independence that 
have been achieved by their western counterparts, they have secured a level of autonomy 
that allows them to shape and interfere with the political debate to an extent that has been 
unknown before. Not without reason, then, politicians in new democracies perceive the 
media as powerful and potentially dangerous. 
Furthermore, the degree of mediatisation is not only a function of the (relative) 
independence of the media, but also of the (relative) power of political elites and institutions. 
During transition ± and often for a long time thereafter ± the capacity of political actors and 
institutions to determine the course of politics is considerably weakened, following the 
collapse of the old mechanisms of power, the loss of legitimacy and lack of experience. This 
position of weakness might open up opportunities for the media to expand their capacity to 
shape the public agenda and to exert pressure on power holders. However, like their western 
counterparts, powerholders try to maintain ± or, in transitional contexts, regain ± control over 
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public communication and the interpretation of political reality. One option to do that would be 
censorship. However, this comes at a high price as it attracts international criticism and 
almost certainly mobilises internal opposition. Therefore, political leaders with authoritarian 
DPELWLRQVKDYHGLVFRYHUHGµPHGLDORJLF¶DVDUHVRXUFHRISRZHUWKDWZRUNVZLWKUDWKHUWKDQ
against, journalistic routines and news values to manipulate public opinion. Vladimir Putin is 
an example of this two-pronged strategy. While systematically driving critical media out of 
business, he has also employed cutting-edge campaign strategies ± notably based on 
western know-how ± that helped him in the 1990s to win elections in spite of low levels of 
popularity (Oates, 2008), thus turning mediatisation into a force that impedes democratic 
development. Another example of authoritarian mediatisation is Hugo Chavez who, as Block 
(2013) shows, used extensive media performances to establish discursive hegemony in 
Venezuela. In an environment of media abundance and international news flows, political 
OHDGHUVKDYHWREHµRQDLU¶DQGLQWHUDFWZLWKWKHPHGLDLQDZD\WKDWLQFRUSRUDWHVMRXUQDOLVWLF
formats of discourse. It is therefore not by accident that the resurgence of democracy of the 
µIRXUWKZDYH¶KDVWULJJHUHGDJOREDOGHPDQGIRUSROLWLFDOPDUNHWLQJDQGPHGLDPDQDJHPHQW
(Plasser and Plasser, 2002). Thus, mediatisation has become a force that not only 
transforms democratic, but also transitional and even authoritarian, politics (Keane, 2015).  
In the following, we present some observations about mediatisation ± or lack thereof 
± LQ µIRXUWKZDYH¶GHPRFUDFLHV WKDWEHJDQWKHSURFHVVRISROLWLFDO WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ under the 
condition of media abundance and technological innovation, focusing on the mediatisation of 
political power and citizenship.  
Citizenship 
One of the striking features of post-1989 transitions is the prominent role of large-
scale popular uprisings in bringing down the old regime, which distinguishes them from the 
primarily elite-GULYHQWUDQVLWLRQVRIWKHµWKLUGZDYH¶WKDWVHWRIILQWKHHDUO\VLQSDUWLFXODU
Spain, but also Latin American transitions of that period). Arguably, the rise of multi-channel, 
trans-border broadcasting that operated beyond the control of national governments created 
SRZHUIXO µGHPRQVWUDWLRQ HIIHFWV¶ +XQWLQJWRQ  WKDW IXHOOHG DQG DFFHOHUDWHG PDVV
demonstrations, in particular in Eastern Europe. Knowing that the whole world was watching, 
citizens felt encouraged to take to the streets in large numbers hoping that an international 
audience would create a protective shield against violent crackdown by the state.3 Trans-
border broadcasting was strategically used by the opposition movements to attract 
international attention. Unlike earlier transitions, which were largely national struggles, the 
GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQPRYHPHQWVRIWKH µIRXUWKZDYH¶EHFDPHLQWHUQDWLRQDOHYHQWV7KLV LVQRWWR
                                                          
3
 7KLVDVVXPSWLRQPDWHULDOLVHG LQ(DVWHUQ(XURSH ZKHUH LW ZDVHQFRXUDJHGE\ *RUEDFKHY¶V FDOO IRU
change, but not for the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square.  
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say that these revolutionary events were triggered by the new media environment. But the 
media were crucial contributing catalysts that enlarged and accelerated the impact of the 
uprisings and to some extent even shaped the outcome of the transition.  
Opposition groups quickly learnt to serve the needs of international media for striking 
LPDJHVQDUUDWLYHVRI µ'DYLGDQG*ROLDWK¶DQGVWRULHVWKDWFRQILUPHGWKH:HVW¶VEHOLHI LQWKH
superiority of its own system. In particular the rise of the so-FDOOHG µFRORXU UHYROXWLRQV¶
indicate that pro-demRFUDF\ PRYHPHQWV DGDSWHG WKHLU VWUDWHJLHV WR µPHGLD ORJLF¶ 7KH
Orange Revolution in Ukraine in the aftermath of the presidential election in 2003 and 
widespread allegations of electoral fraud is an example of a skilfully orchestrated event that 
used methods of branding and the PR know-how of foreign advisors to produce powerful 
images that were reproduced by the media around the world (McFaul, 2007). Other uprisings 
IROORZHGDVLPLODUYLVXDOVWUDWHJ\IRUH[DPSOH*HRUJLD¶V5RVH5HYROXWLRQLQWKH7XOLp 
Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, the Saffron Revolution in Burma 2007, the Green 
Revolution in Iran 2009, and so on. Pro-democracy uprisings have become highly mediatised 
events which draw their dynamic from a close interdependency between protesters and 
(mostly international) media. However, strategies of mediatised and internationalised 
uprisings come at a price. The focus on global media attention often led opposition groups to 
neglect domestic aspects of their strategy, such as building alliances across groups and with 
parts of the elites, which might explain ± at least to some extent ± why some of these 
uprisings were rather short-lived or were quickly absorbed by powerful elite groups. 
Meanwhile, cases of mediatised transitions display the transformational effects media 
can play in the emergence of democracy. New mobile and internet technologies mean that 
transitional democracies operate not only in an environment of media and information 
abundance, but in other forms and from sources other than a teleological view of 
democratisation and mediatisation might expect. Transitional states are in some cases not 
only leapfrogging into the problems and dysfunctionalities of 21st century democracy. They 
are also leapfrogging into a form of mediatised democracy which often combines 
underdeveloped traditional media, in particular the absence of forum media like public 
service broadcasting, with widespread individualised digital media, in particular cheap mobile 
technologies. This presents civil society with both opportunities and constraints. The 
RSSRUWXQLWLHV IRUSROLWLFDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIZKDW'LDPRQG WHUPV µOLEHUDWLRQ WHFKQRORJ\¶ 
have been expounded by many, especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring: increased 
information access, citizens adopting the watchdog role where mainstream media are unable 
to (El-Khalili, 2013), mobilisation and an expanded sphere of participation (Lim, 2013). Yet 
QHZ FRPPXQLFDWLRQ WHFKQRORJLHV DUH QRW ³LPEXHG ZLWK VRPH NLQG RI LUUHVLVWLEOH DJHQF\´
(Deibert and Rohozinski, 2010, p. 44). Arguably, for the first time in the history of 
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communication media, the same technologies that are used by citizens to mobilise 
resistance, have also been used for control, surveillance and propaganda by post-
revolutionary authoritarian regimes in, for instance, Egypt (El-Khalili, 2013) and Iran (Aday et 
al., 2010). 
Moreover, where technology clearly has played a role in increasing participation in 
liberation movements, such digital networks often have a short-term effect on politics 
(Couldry, 2015). Even though digital communication technologies have enabled large-scale 
PDVVPRELOLVDWLRQ WKHQDWXUHRI µQHWZRUNPHGLDORJLF¶PHDQVWKDWWKLV LVRIWHQ WDNLQJSODFH
without any kind of unifying force in the form of leadership, ideas, ideology or long-term 
strategy. The logic of connective action may result in new forms of mobilisation and 
potentially increased participation in democratisation movements as was the case in Egypt in 
2011 (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012, pp. 743±4). But even where a regime is toppled, the 
personalised frames and networked organisation of connective action fail to equip activists to 
move into the power vacuum that opens up after regime change and to shape the outcome 
of the transition. There is no leader to unify a fragmented yet expectant population, no 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ WR SURYLGH D IUDPHZRUN IRU VXVWDLQHG SROLWLFDO DFWLRQV RQFH µQRUPDO SROLWLFV¶
returns, no vision to drive them forward towards a common goal. The structural properties of 
mediatisation 2.0 have further exacerbates the inability ± often unwillingness ± of anti-regime 
movements to move from the politics of street mobilisation to the politics of institutional 
bargaining, thus leaving the situation open to exploitation by individual and collective sources 
of power that are somehow capable of providing a unifying structure. And more often than 
not these are those who have already been key players in the old regime. 4  
Political institutions 
7RXQGHUVWDQGWKHQHZPHGLDHQYLURQPHQWWKDWVKDSHVµIRXUWKZDYH¶WUDQVLWLRQVLt is 
XVHIXO WR UHPLQG RXUVHOYHV RI WKH FRQGLWLRQV XQGHU ZKLFK µVHFRQG ZDYH¶ SRVW-WW2) and 
µWKLUG ZDYH¶ V GHPRFUDFLHV VHW RXW WR HVWDEOLVK WKHPVHOYHV &KDQQHO VFDUFLW\ PHDQW
that one dominant broadcaster, formerly state-owned and usually only insufficiently 
transformed into an independent institution, served as the national forum for political 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ ,Q WKLV HQYLURQPHQW µPHGLD ORJLF¶ ZDV ODUJHO\ FRQWDLQHG DOORZLQJ SROLWLFDO
elites to control the post-transitional narrative without the need to adopt sophisticated media 
strategies. The low level of mediatisation helped the new political order to stabilise in relative 
isolation from the public eye. But this also meant that those in power were able to carry on in 
                                                          
4
 Western democracy aid has often been similarly short-sighted. By focusing on supporting internet 
activists and their short-term mobilisation power, too little consideration has been given to developing 
their long-term political skills offline (see Christensen, 2011). 
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an accountability vacuum, fostering corruption, impunity of crimes committed during the past 
regime, and inefficiency in post-transitional governments.  
,QµIRXUWKZDYH¶GHPRFUDFLHVWKHVLWXDWLRQLVDOPRVWUHYHUVH1RZLQVWLWXWLRQEXLOGLQJ
takes place in a multi-channel environment that makes it difficult for political actors to 
influence public opinion. Even though in most emerging democracies governments have 
maintained a great deal of control over the main broadcaster, its hegemony and authority is 
undermined by a plethora of alternative voices of domestic and international origin. 
Especially the young generation, which in the developing world makes up for the majority of 
the population, has turned to the internet and social media for information as they put more 
trust in these sources WKDQLQµOHJDF\PHGLD¶&RQIURQWHGZLWKKLJKO\SROLWLFLVHGVHJPHQWVRI
the citizenry and a more pro-active, if not aggressive, journalism, the need for political elites 
to control the public agenda is even higher than in previous waves of democratisation. To 
achieve this, old-fashioned means of control and censorship are no longer effective. Instead, 
political actors ± including governments, political parties, but equally civil society groups and 
political activists ± KDYHWRDGDSW WR WKH µORJLFV¶RIERWKRld and new media and incorporate 
sophisticated media strategies even before political institutions and durable organisational 
structures have been re-built (Voltmer, 2011). Indeed, media strategies often replace the 
development of organisational structures. Especially actors such as political parties, who 
depend on mass mobilisation, invest large amounts of resources to professionalise their 
campaign capacities.  
In particular in Eastern Europe this has given rise to the type of elite party (Katz and 
Mair, 1995) that is built around small groups of elites without significant grass-roots 
membership. The primary purpose of these parties is to function as electoral machines for 
candidates, often without offering any ideological vision or meaningful programme of policy. 
µ6SLQ¶DQGPHGLDVWUDWHJLHVDUHWKHUHIRUHHVVHQWLDOIRUHOHFWRUDOVXFFHVV+RZHYHUDORQJVLGH
these media-based parties another type of party plays a key role in many emerging 
democracies: that of a mass-based party that has its roots in pre-transition times, either as 
the leading oppositional actor (for example the ANC in South Africa) or as the ruling party of 
the old regime (for example former communist parties in Eastern Europe). The Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt is another example of an old organisation who were able to use their 
structural resources to gain power in post-revolutionary Egypt - even though they were 
unable to secure their position against old elites and the military. What distinguishes these 
parties from their newly established, elite-centred counterparts is a strong ideological identity, 
a strong presence on the ground which secures them broad popular support, in particular 
among the lower strata of society and ± most importantly ± a low degree of mediatisation. 
Media strategies remain rather peripheral to the organisational structure and the 
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communicative practices of these parties, which draw their strength from local networks and 
face-to-face interaction with their supporters. Thus, mediatisation is an integral part of the 
transLWLRQ SURFHVV RI µIRXUWK ZDYH¶ GHPRFUDFLHV DQG DOORZV QHZ SROLWLFDO HQWUHSUHQHXUV WR
enter the electoral contest. It can also be exploited as a power resource in the volatile arena 
of post-transitional politics where institutional structures have lost their constraining power 
leaving the field open to communication-savvy individuals. However, the degree to which this 
is the case varies significantly across new democracies, depending on the particular features 
of the political as well as media systems and communication cultures that are rooted in 
traditional norms and practices of interaction. Thus, large spheres of non-mediatised politics 
continue to exist, which provide identity and social coherence in times of chaotic change.  
 
The rise of populist politics can serve as an example of the ambiguity of mediatised 
politics in emerging democracies. It illustrates that mediatised politics provides a way of 
establishing links between political power and citizens where the institutions of intermediation 
are weak, while at the same time challenging the politics of liberal democracy. Populism is by 
no means unique to emerging democracies. Established democracies ± from Italy and 
France to India and Australia ± are increasingly seeing the rise of populist parties and even 
populist leaders entering government positions. But new democracies are particularly 
vulnerable to populism as they have an acute need for symbolic representation that can 
SURYLGH D VLPSOH QDUUDWLYH RI µZKR ZH DUH ZKHUH ZH DUH FRPLQJ IURP DQG ZKHUH Ze are 
JRLQJ¶ ,Q WUDQVLWLRQDOVRFLHWLHV WKH WUDXPDRIGLFWDWRUVKLSDQGFLYLOYLROHQFH WKH SHUFHLYHG
failure of the new political order to provide the better life people had hoped ± and fought ± for, 
and the uncertainty of the future in a globalised world provide fertile ground for populists who 
FRQVWUXFWDQRWLRQRIWKHµKHDUWODQG¶7DJJDUWWKDWFDQEHUHFUHDWHGDQGWKDWSURYLGHV
hope and comfort to people in times of insecurity and instability.  
Populist politics, by framing itself as citizen politics, is thus able to speak to the 
motivations of a citizenry in democratic transition by emphasising those anti-establishment 
and anti-institutional motivations that led them to initiate democratisation in the first place. 
Yet populists construct a notion of the people that at once idolises them by adorning them 
with the knowledge and capability required for more direct forms of democracy, whilst 
simultaneously reducing them to a homogenous mass purged of individualised political ideals 
or agency. Populism thus provides an alternative to mainstream politics in transition by 
offering a symbolic vision to the people in a simplistic, often spectacular and provocative 
IRUPDW WKDWFDSWXUHVWKHPHGLD¶V LPDJLQDWLRQ ,WFDQWDNHDGYDQWDJHRI IUDJLOH LQVWLWXWLRQV Ln 
transitional democracies to come to power (De la Torre, 2014, p. 7), and once in power 
further undermines institution building because it disregards, often ridicules liberal institutions 
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of representation. In doing so, populists rely on an ambiguity constructed through the 
performance of symbolic representation that allows them to occupy the territory at the edges 
of mainstream politics where they strike a fine balance between radical sentiment and 
democratic legitimacy.  
The effects of populism on democratisation are likewise ambiguous. Effects have 
been shown to be stronger in unconsolidated democracies and depend on whether populists 
occupy a position of power (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012). In opposition, populism can have 
a positive effect on democratisation as it serves to increase political participation, constructs 
cross-class political coalitions and emphasises democratic accountability. Yet in power, the 
effects turn negative as populism prioritises majority rule over liberal democratic ideals. The 
results are a destabilisation of democratic institutions, a challenge to the separation of 
powers, and eroding trust in the legitimacy of newly established institutions (ibid. 2012). We 
VHHWKHVHHIIHFWVLQWKHGHOHJDWLYHGHPRFUDFLHVRI/DWLQ$PHULFD2¶'Rnnell, 1994) that are 
only symbolically representative in the form of the personalist leader and often exist in a 
symbiotic relationship with the media (Voltmer, 2011). An example from the range of 
countries covered by MeCoDEM would be South Africa and PreVLGHQW -DFRE =XPD¶V
populist-authoritarian style of government. In either case, though populism is known for being 
short-lived (see e.g. Taggart, 2000), the last decade has seen many cases of populists 
sustaining themselves in power (McDonnell and Albertazzi, 2015) by consolidating their 
message of representation of the (right) people. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Over the last quarter of a century, innovations in communication technology have 
fundamentally changed the way in which information is produced and shared. In fact, it is no 
exaggeration to talk about a communication revolution that changed human relationships on 
every level, be it between individuals, between governments and citizens or even between 
states.  
In this paper we set out to explore the impact the new communication environment 
PLJKWKDYHRQWKHSROLWLFVRIWKHHPHUJLQJGHPRFUDFLHVRIWKHµIRXUWK ZDYH¶7RDQDO\VHWKH
transformation of the relationship between politics and the media in emerging democracies, 
this paper draws on the concept of mediatisation as the process of political institutions 
incorporating the logic of media institutions ± their norms and routines ± into their own 
organisational form and decision-making processes. Mediatisation has so far has been 
exclusively applied to political communication in advanced western democracies and mainly 
to institutionalised politics. However, we have discussed how mediatisation also plays a role 
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outside institutional politics, in citizen and contentious politics, and how this often happens 
through non-institutional media like social media. Broadening the concept of mediatisation to 
give it a less institutional focus and enable it to account for hybrid and network media logics 
and the role of different types of political actors also demonstrates how such actors can 
appropriate different forms of media logic as a resource of power and even change the 
direction of mediatisation. Mediatisation then also becomes applicable in some emerging 
democracies. It takes on similar forms as in established democracies ± where it is likewise 
multi-layered and can co-exist with non-mediatised politics ± but, because of the particular 
conditions of transitional politics, it yields different outcomes.  
In transitional politics political actors ± from protest movements to governments ± rely 
heavily on the media as a central, often exclusive resource to enhance influence and to 
achieve political goals. Digital communication technologies and media strategies are highly 
effective tools to mobilise public opinion. But they are more than tools; they also shape and 
often replace the building of organisational structures. An example of this process is the 
HPHUJLQJ µORJLFRIFRQQHFWLYHDFWLRQ¶ WKDWIROORZVWKHQRUPVDQGVWUXFWXUHVRIVRFLDOPHGLD
Individualised participation and the resistance against hierarchical structures have made 
µFRQQHFWLYHDFWLRQ¶DQLQFUHGLEO\SRZHUIXOZDy of mobilising citizens, but have widely failed to 
influence institutional politics in the aftermath of regime changes, as the Egyptian example 
shows.  
Another example is the close interaction between mediatisation and populism. In an 
increasing number of new (but also established) democracies, representative politics has 
been challenged by the rise of populist leaders. Arguably, modern populism is a form of 
politics that flourishes in media-saturated environments. Being highly dependent on the 
resonance of the media, populist politics shapes its rhetoric, messages and organisation 
DURXQG µPHGLD ORJLF¶ (YHQ WKRXJK SRSXOLVW OHDGHUV LQ HPHUJLQJ GHPRFUDFLHV RIWHQ XVH
exclusionary, nationalist appeals to mobilise support, populism also seeks new forms of 
connecting directly with citizens and building a sense of community. However, disguised 
behind anti-elitist rhetoric, political leaders in new democracies have also used symbolic 
representation and mediated mobilisation to strengthen authoritarian structures of power and 
indeed a closure of public spaces of expression.  
The two examples highlight the ambivalent nature of mediatisation in transitional 
democracies. Mediatisation of politics has opened up new opportunities for citizen politics, 
but has also undermined the establishment of sustainable and effective institutions. 
Mediatisation is a way of challenging political authority, but at the same time serves the 
authoritarian ambitions of political leaders. Furthermore, mediatisation increases the power 
of the media in politics and at the same time forces political actors to develop strategies to 
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instrumentalise and muzzle them. It thus has profound and complex implications for the 
GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ SURFHVV DQG KDV FUHDWHG D XQLTXH VLWXDWLRQ IRU WUDQVLWLRQV RI WKH µIRXUWK
ZDYH¶ 7KH UHVHDUFK SURJUDPPH RI WKH 0H&R'(0-project seeks to better understand the 
conditions, scope and consequences of mediatised politics in transitional societies.  
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